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About This Document
This document provides a Roadmap for using the InCommon identity federation to enable 
researchers to access NSF cyberinfrastructure (CI) via their campus authentication service. It 
presents benefits and challenges of using InCommon for NSF cyberinfrastructure, and guidance 
in overcoming the challenges.  The Roadmap has three main sections, each aligned for a different 
audience:
A. Benefits, Challenges and Overview is intended for campus and project leadership, scientists 
and engineers using CI. It provides a summary of InCommon, relevant technologies and 
the benefits and challenges their adoption brings. 
B. The Guide to Technical Deployment is intended for information technology professionals, 
from campuses and NSF cyberinfrastructure projects, and is a guide for deployment of 
InCommon software and services. 
C. The Guide to Policy and Business Processes is intended for managers and policy makers, and 
discusses the policy, privacy, financial and other factors of InCommon deployment. Again it 
is both for staff from campuses and NSF cyberinfrastructure projects. 
A final section provides a glossary, references and other resources.
This document is an abbreviated version of the whole Roadmap, omitting sections B and C to focus 
on issues of interest to campus and project leadership. The complete document can be found at 
http://www.incommon.org/nsfroadmap.html
In order to be insulated from inevitable changes in technologies and to be as comprehensible as 
possible, the document avoids capturing technical details when it can, instead providing references 
to existing (particularly online) documentation provided by InCommon, Internet2 and other 
organizations.
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Document Scope
There are a wide variety of federated identity technologies and organizations that seek to form trust 
amongst organizations for online collaboration.  This document is specific to InCommon, with its 
focus on higher education and research institutions, institutions that are highly aligned with the 
NSF science and engineering community. 
This document also focuses on the needs of NSF cyberinfrastructure (CI) Projects, which are 
projects providing computer-based resources (e.g., compute cycles, data resources, shared 
instrumentation, web-based applications, virtual organizations) to scientists and engineers, and 
having some need to identify those researchers in order to, for example, perform access control, 
resource authorization, audit usage, or provide personalization. A full discussion of CI is beyond 
the scope of this document, for context the reader is referred to [59]. As subsequently discussed in 
Section A.1, NSF CI projects frequently have requirements above and beyond normal InCommon 
service providers and this document focuses on meeting those requirements.  
In addition, the document is scoped as follows:
•	 InCommon is most accurately a federation based on the SAML protocol, and this document 
has chosen to focus on Shibboleth as a popular open source SAML implementation used in 
InCommon. Alternatives to Shibboleth, InCommon and SAML are discussed in Section A.5. 
•	 As discussed in the Guide to Policy and Business Processes, InCommon allows for higher levels 
of assurance beyond the base level required for membership – i.e. Bronze and Silver. For the 
purposes of brevity, this document constrains itself to a brief discussion of when these higher 
assurance levels may be appropriate for a CI project to consider.
•	 This document covers cyberinfrastructure projects serving NSF researchers and institutions 
of higher education and research that host those researchers. Effort was made to discuss 
experiences with a variety of institutions of different sizes as to avoid assumptions regarding 
available resources and expertise.
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A. Why Use InCommon and Federated 
Identity
“Today’s scientists and engineers need access to new information technology 
capabilities, such as distributed wired and wireless observing network complexes, 
and sophisticated simulation tools that permit exploration of phenomena that 
can never be observed or replicated by experiment. Computation offers new 
models of behavior and modes of scientific discovery that greatly extend the 
limited range of models that can be produced with mathematics alone, for 
example, chaotic behavior. Fewer and fewer researchers working at the frontiers 
of knowledge can carry out their work without cyberinfrastructure of one form or 
another.”
As this quote from the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) “Cyberinfrastructure Vision for 21st 
Century Discovery” [59] describes, cyberinfrastructure (CI) is a key and necessary component 
to support increasingly collaborative science and engineering. As opposed to traditional high-
performance computing, a key goal of CI is to support scientific collaboration through a variety 
of computational, network, data and software elements distributed across campuses, regional, 
national and international organizations, and spanning scientific communities.
Critical to supporting the CI ecology is a well-coordinated, usable identity management system on 
which CI services can be built to allow for trusted collaboration and sharing of compute and data 
resources across researchers’ institutions. To this end, the joint EDUCAUSE-CASC workshop on CI 
[13] recommended:
“Agencies, campuses, and national and state organizations should adopt a single, 
open, standards-based system for identity management, authentication, and 
authorization, thus improving the usability and interoperability of CI resources 
throughout the nation.”
The same workshop report continues and specifically recommends the InCommon federation as 
the current best solution for broad adoption. 
The InCommon federation represents an implementation of federated identity. Federated identity 
refers to the practice of one organization receiving and utilizing identity information regarding 
a user from another organization, typically the organization at which the user is employed or 
is otherwise a member. The objective is that the latter organization leverages the work the first 
organization has done in enrolling the user, managing a credential (e.g., password1) for the user, 
and asserting attributes about the user.
Federated identities in general, and InCommon in particular, are becoming standards in 
establishing trust in the research sector.  InCommon has other federal partners, including the 
Department of Energy’s Energy Sciences Network (ESNet) and the National Institutes of Health.
1 We note that campuses are free to use any authentication credential they desire with InCommon, 
however passwords are common and this document tends to use that term, as it is familiar for many readers.
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The goal of this Roadmap is to encourage more effective scientific collaboration and team science 
supported by campus and NSF CI by fostering the use of InCommon in order to:
1. Allow researchers to more easily collaborate and coordinate multiple resources through a 
single identity system rather than spending effort on managing multiple identities.
2. Allow NSF CI projects to leverage InCommon saving effort spent on establishing their own 
identity systems.
3. Allow campuses and other institutions to provide their researchers with a consistent 
identity system for local research and administrative computing, and remote research 
computing.
The Roadmap strives to achieve this goal by providing campuses and CI projects with the rationale 
and guidance for deploying and using federated identity, joining InCommon, and supporting 
collaborative science using that infrastructure. 
A.1. What is unique about NSF CI?
A reasonable question is why NSF CI needs a roadmap in addition to the guides for adoption 
of federated identity and InCommon that already exist? NSF CI represents a number of science-
enabling collaborations and resources, including rare (even unique) and valuable computational, 
data and instruments. CI representing these resources often has one or more of the following 
attributes, which make them atypical of InCommon service providers:
•	 Strong requirements for secured sharing: Computational resources are commonly among 
the worlds most powerful and it is not unheard of for them to fall under U.S. Export Control 
law.  NSF CI also manages scientific data created and owned by researchers, data which can 
have privacy, integrity and trusted sharing requirements based on its implications to research 
results that can effect scientific standing and policy issues (e.g., climate change, human subjects 
information).
•	 Distributed researcher communities: A NSF CI project typically has distributed, dynamic 
researcher communities that don’t conform to any group of researchers at any one campus or 
other institution. For example, access to TeraGrid is granted via a national allocations process 
that occurs multiple times per year [66]. Many projects have less formal processes involving 
collaboration participants who may come and go depending on current research interests and 
their alignment with the project. 
•	 A history of identity management: Because of the nature of their resources and communities, 
NSF CI projects often have stringent, self-managed access control requirements. To meet these 
requirements, there is a history in NSF CI projects of performing strong vetting of their users 
and persistent account management. This creates a situation of researchers having multiple 
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digital personas (one for their institution plus additional personas for each project they are 
involved in), thus creating a barrier to trusted virtual collaboration. 
•	 A need for incident response: NSF CI projects often have a need to perform incident response 
to understand the implications of any data breech; a need that is otherwise underrepresented 
in typical federated identity applications.
•	 Non-web access modalities: NSF CI projects often have command-line access modalities that 
are not currently supported by typical federated identity software (though as we discuss in 
Section D.2, such support is planned). For example, a common means of accessing NSF CI is 
through secure shell (SSH) to obtain command-line access and do job submission. 
A.2. Brief Overview of Federated Identity and InCommon
We briefly present some basic terminology regarding federated identity and InCommon as shown 
in Figure 1. For more complete and technical 
definitions of the terms, the reader is referred 
to the Glossary.
The term “federated identity” refers to the 
ability to utilize a user’s identity, as managed 
by one organization, across multiple 
organizations. A collection of organizations 
that agree to a common set of practices and 
policies for federated identity are referred to as 
a federation, with the member organizations 
being referred to as participants.
An example of a federation is InCommon, 
which focuses on institutions of higher 
education and organizations providing 
services to those institutions. InCommon is 
governed by its members [25] and operated by 
Internet2.
Within a federation, participants are identity 
providers that instantiate institutionally 
managed services that authenticate users and 
allow their identities to be shared with service 
providers, who consume those identities in 
order to provide access to resources or services.  
For example, the Indiana University identity 
management system represents an identity 
Figure 1. The InCommon landscape showing 
Identity Providers (campuses and institutions), 
the InCommon Federation, and Service Providers 
such as digital libraries, campus services, 
collaboration, and cyberinfrastructure. Enabling 
technologies include the SAML standard and the 
Shibboleth software.
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provider, providing institutional credentials and guaranteeing that researchers with Indiana 
University logins have been physically vetted.  A service provider, such as the Indiana Clinical 
and Translational Sciences Institute HUB [43], accepts institutional credentials from a number 
of identity providers and allows users of those identity providers access to cyberinfrastructure 
services such as data management and shared computational facilities.
The term “identity” is used to refer the aggregate of identifiers, which uniquely identifies an 
individual, with a collection of zero or more attributes regarding that person. Identifiers can 
be ephemeral, used only for a single session, pseudonomymous, persistent for arbitrarily long 
periods of time but not reflecting the user’s physical identity, or fully identifying, persistent and 
reflective of the user’s physical identity  (e.g., an email address). Attributes provide information 
about a person such as their institutional role (e.g., faculty), department, class enrollment, or 
contact information (e.g., phone number). Privacy is preserved by the controlled release of 
identity information to service providers, a process referred to as attribute release.
InCommon is based on the SAML standard [67], which defines message formats and protocols to 
provide for interoperability among participants. Building on SAML, eduPerson [15] defines a set 
of user attributes common to educational institutions that is heavily used in InCommon.
A key function of the federation is to manage and distribute metadata among its participants. 
Metadata, whose format is defined by the SAML standard, is information that describes federation 
participants (identity and service providers) and allows participants to securely communicate 
identity information.  
To utilize InCommon, software is needed that implements the SAML standards and provides 
identity providers with the tools to provide identities, service providers with the tools to consume 
identities, and users of the system the tools to express their intents with regards to authentication 
and privacy. A number of commercial and open-source SAML implementations are available. 
Shibboleth [78] is frequently used in InCommon. It is freely available as an open source project 
spearheaded by Internet2, and the focus of choice for this Roadmap.
A.3. Benefits for Researcher, Institution and CI Project
In this section, we describe the benefits for using federated identity and InCommon to support 
NSF science and engineering from three perspectives: that of the NSF researcher, that of the CI 
project, and that of the researcher’s institution. 
A.3.1. Benefits to the Researcher
To help understand the benefits of federated identities in research, we introduce you to Jean Blue, 
Professor and Researcher, and present a morning in her life supported by federated identity.
Dr. Blue gets up in the morning and logs into her campus to check her email. 
One of the notes is from her campus sponsored research office, indicating 
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that a report is due on her NSF grant. She goes to the sponsored research office 
web site, and selects the research.gov link there. Because she previously logged 
in to her campus to check email, and because research.gov trusts her campus to 
provide accurate, up to date identity information, Dr. Blue’s prior authentication 
is automatically used to allow access to her research.gov account and Dr. Blue 
uploads the requested report.
Another one of her emails alerts her to new data posted on the translational 
research wiki at National Institutes Health (https://www.ctsawiki.org/wiki/).  
She navigates to wiki, which like research.gov uses her prior institutional login 
to authenticate and welcome her directly to her personal wiki page. Seeing new 
data sets available, she decides to launch a job on the TeraGrid to analyze them. 
She opens a browser window to CILogon (https://cilogon.org/), which notes her 
campus authentication but asks her to release some additional attributes, such as a 
screen name, as requested by the CI service providers.
Jean then checks on the latest data for a clinical trial she is managing. The data is 
stored on Jean’s local campus and accessible via secured web site, which permits 
her access based on her previous login.  The site presents her with a request for 
access from a colleague at another institution to collaborate on a paper they are co-
authoring. To make the request, the colleague authenticated to that data store with 
their campus login and approved the release of attributes - campus department and 
role in this case - to help validate the request. Jean reviews the request, recognizing 
the collaborator based on their name and attributes, and approves the request, 
granting access without having to create another username and password for the 
colleague.
Finally, Jean jumps over to Elsevier (http://www.sciencedirect.com/) to check some 
recent journals. The site welcomes her back, granting her access based on her status 
as her campus without knowing her actual identity, and alerts her that three of her 
watch-list words had been triggered by articles in her chosen journals. Jean sighs, 
and flags them for later reading.
It has been a busy morning, with a lot of collaboration done, all with a single 
campus identity.
How much of Jean Blue’s story is real today? Every site with a URL is operational today using 
federated identities; the other scenarios are under active development.
As illustrated by this example, the direct benefit to the researcher is that they can utilize many 
CI resources without having to create yet another username and password for each. Initially this 
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expedites obtaining access to CI by removing delays with secure distribution of passwords to these 
resources.  Over the lifetime of the researcher’s access, it removes the need for the researcher to 
manage a separate username and password, reducing the chance of forgetting the password and 
giving them an existing campus support system for changing the password, resetting it in the 
event they forget it, etc.  This not only means that there is a higher level of security, but also less 
overall effort since each of these services does not have to repeat a vetting process to ensure that 
the researcher is who they claim, instead leveraging the effort performed by their institutional 
identity provider.  This is especially important for access to secured resources such as the TeraGrid or 
sensitive data, such as human subjects data.
In the bigger picture, the utilization of their campus login for access is a key first step to allowing 
someone to utilize any CI without concern about where it might be located or who is operating 
it.  This allows researchers to focus on science and scientific collaboration without having to worry 
about what collaborators have accounts where, setting up authentication services, and the like.
For researchers with security concerns about data and other resources they are sharing in their 
collaboration, the use of campus credentials provides greater assurance, as collaborators will be 
less inclined to share or otherwise mishandle those credentials as they might a password generated 
solely for the collaboration.   The credentials are also tied to the collaborator’s position at an 
institution, meaning that in the event a researcher loses academic status, and the identity will be 
revoked and cannot be used for access.  This allows service providers to more easily provide trusted 
access to sensitive data, and administrative processes for study review, like Institutional Review 
Boards (IRBs) can be undertaken with greater confidence and streamlined.
Finally, funding agencies, such as NIH (see [49]) and NSF, have joined InCommon and are moving 
towards federated identity as the access mechanism for grant application and administration. 
Utilization of federated identity for CI will bring uniformity to the authentication mechanism for 
science in line with the business processes of doing science.
A.3.2. Benefits for the CI project
“Harvesting the science content from LIGO [Laser Interferometer Gravitational-
Wave Observatory] data is a collaborative effort between instrumentalists, data 
analysts, modelers, and theorists. Efficient collaboration begins with scalable 
and robust identity management infrastructure that can easily be leveraged and 
integrated with the wide spectrum of tools LIGO scientists use to collaborate and 
analyze the LIGO data. Middleware from Internet2, including Shibboleth and 
Grouper, is enabling more LIGO science through easier collaboration and access 
to resources.” -- Scott Koranda, Senior Scientist at the University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee and lead architect of the LIGO [54] Identity Management effort
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A NSF CI project receives many of the same benefits from InCommon as any other InCommon 
Service Provider. Descriptions of these benefits, including multi-media presentations, can be found 
at the InCommon for Service Providers web site [32]. We summarize the benefits here and highlight 
those most applicable to CI projects.
The immediate benefit of federated identity to a project with any sort of access control requirements 
is that they still control who has access to their resources, but authentication is performed by their 
researchers’ home institutions, getting the project out of the business of creating password databases 
and distributing passwords (and re-distributing them when they are lost). Initially, this has the 
benefit of expediting the granting of access to new users since they already possess their passwords. 
A case study from the Swedish Alliance for Middleware Infrastructure on federated identity 
addressing costs of the identity vetting process can be found in [55].
In the longer term, federated identity also reduces overhead on the project for managing researchers’ 
passwords – e.g., resetting forgotten passwords, regular expiration – allowing the researcher instead 
to use already familiar campus processes. This reduction in responsibility can be of particular 
benefit to smaller, resource-constrained projects and collaborations.
From a security perspective, the use of the campus password for authentication also decreases 
the chance the researcher shares or otherwise mishandles that password, resulting in increased 
assurance of the user’s identity. Removing the need to distribute passwords reduces risk of password 
exposure. And expediting researcher access by removing the need for password distribution acts to 
decrease the motivation for users to share passwords.
Furthermore, access can be based on researcher’s attributes; for example, their role as faculty at 
their campus, either solely or in addition to the user’s identifier. This use allows for automatic 
provisioning and de-provisioning of researcher access without time consuming verification of these 
attributes by project staff. For example, a service could verify on every use that a researcher remains 
their position as asserted by their home institution.
From the perspective of adoption, providing researchers access with an existing credential, and one 
potentially in use by other CI projects, removes one step in setting up the project CI, reducing a 
barrier to entry and encouraging use.
A.3.3. Benefits for the researcher’s institution
As in the previous section on benefits to CI projects, campuses receive a number of benefits from 
the adoption of InCommon and federated identity that are documented by InCommon [28]. We 
summarize those benefits here and highlight those most applicable to supporting NSF science and 
engineering CI projects:
•	 Controlled, scalable access to external services. Shibboleth and InCommon provide a scalable 
means of providing controlled access to external services. For example, they can replace current 
schemes based on IP addresses for controlled access to digital libraries with a scheme based on 
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the institution’s provisioned user base [37]. A complete list of InCommon Sponsored Partners 
either providing or in the process of providing access via InCommon can be found on the 
InCommon participants web page [11].
•	 Privacy controls. Shibboleth gives the campus and its faculty, staff and students privacy controls 
with regards to what attributes are released to each service provider. It supports anonymous 
and pseudonymous authentication, and the ability to receive user consent for the release of 
attributes, which can be beneficial in addressing legal requirements such as FERPA or HIPAA.
•	 Visibility into CI usage. The use of federated identity gives the campus visibility into the 
use of CI (and other services) by its user community since the campus is now part of the 
authentication process. This allows for the collection of aggregated, privacy-respecting statistics 
on what services are used by what types of users, and with what frequency.
•	 Grant competitiveness. Supporting federated identity will increasingly be important to grant 
competitiveness as the grant process moves to InCommon, as science increasingly moves to 
team science, and as effective collaborations improve science outcomes.  InCommon will 
permit institutional researchers improved, or even preapproved, access to offsite data and 
analytical resources, allowing them to be more competitive in terms of research.
•	 Uniform authentication mechanism. Providing an authentication mechanism usable by 
both researchers on campus and their external collaborators helps prevent “home-grown” 
authentication systems being set up by researchers in front of potentially sensitive data (e.g., a 
collaboration sharing clinical data). In general, providing the same authentication mechanism 
for internal CI that is used by external CI allows the campus to provide CI locally for researchers 
and their collaborators that removes a barrier to transitioning between that local CI and 
regional or national CI.
•	 Internal single sign-on. Federated identity provides web single sign-on internal to the campus 
with the usual benefits of doing so, namely a single password for users, centralized provisioning 
of accounts, and central auditing. 
•	 InCommon certificate service. A side benefit to joining InCommon is access to the InCommon 
Certificate Service [29], providing X.509 certificates (SSL, EV, personal signing, encryption, and 
code signing) for a fixed annual fee.
A.4. Challenges of Federated Identity
In order to be balanced in our presentation, we discuss here the challenges to deploying and using 
federated identity and InCommon. In the following section, we discuss some of the alternatives to 
InCommon and their trade-offs. The authors of this Roadmap believe these challenges are out-
weighed by the advantages and the approach of this roadmap is at least as good a choice as the 
alternatives, but we acknowledge that every solution has disadvantages as well as advantages and so 
include this section in the interest of full disclosure.
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A.4.1. Mature Identity Management as a Required Prerequisite
In our discussions with organizations that have deployed Shibboleth and joined InCommon, a 
consistent prerequisite that came up was the organization having a “mature” identity management 
system in place before it undertakes federated identity. What constitutes “mature” is somewhat 
subjective, however the following have emerged as key features:
•	 A centralized user directory infrastructure. The organization has a single known, authoritative 
source for user information (authentication and attributes) with defined interfaces for accessing 
that information and controls on its modification.
•	 Understood business processes for user enrollment. The organization understands how users 
are enrolled in their identity management system, how their roles are assigned, and how they 
are removed from the system. This includes an understanding, at least, of what the edge cases 
are; for example: guest logins, anonymous library users, contractors, incoming students, and 
incoming faculty.
•	 Automated user provisioning. Based on the business processes, user provisioning and de-
provisioning in the identity management system (i.e. addition, removal and attribute 
management of users), should be, at least for a majority of users, automated.
To be clear, an organization doesn’t need to have these completely solved (no organization 
probably does), but more complete solutions lead to easier federated identity deployment and 
higher levels of trust.
Establishing an identity management system is outside the scope of this document, however some 
resources for doing so can be found in Section D.2.
A.4.2. Changes to Risk Profile
Federated identity turns what used to be an identity management process that was internal to an 
organization into a process distributed across multiple organizations. This brings changes to the risk 
profile of an adopting organization:
•	 Reliance on the external infrastructure. For a CI project, the trade-off for reduced workload 
and interoperability is a reliance on the InCommon federation and federation partners (and 
interconnecting infrastructure), which entails risks to both reliability and security. Related 
to this is that in the bigger picture, by increasing the scope of use for a single authentication, 
we increase the impact if that authentication is fraudulent (put simply, if the researcher’s 
campus password is stolen, it grants illicit access to more services with federated identity). 
Quantification of these risks is difficult because they depend on the specific set of services 
used by each individual researcher and a lack of long-term operational data, but is something 
participants need to be aware of and accept (or identify mitigation strategies for).
•	 Reliance on enabling technologies. The use of federated identity involves relying on enabling 
technologies, for example Shibboleth software. Mitigating this risk is InCommon’s use of open 
standards and Shibboleth’s track record as an Internet2 member-supported software project.
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•	 Risk of user attribute exposure. Shibboleth provides attribute release policies to control, on a 
service provider by service provider basis, the sharing of user attributes. Nevertheless, there is 
still a risk of human or software error resulting in inappropriate sharing. Emerging technologies 
such as uApprove [93] allows users to participate in attribute release and mitigates this risk.
A.4.3. Expenses of InCommon Membership and Shibboleth 
Deployment
For organizations that chose to deploy Shibboleth and manage the process of joining InCommon 
themselves, which is a very typical thing to do, the largest cost will be staff time. In the subsequent 
section (A.4.4) we summarize the effort required for organizations to estimate this cost.
In addition to staff time other expenses include:
•	 InCommon Participant Fees: Currently $1000-$3000 annually depending on the size of the 
organization plus a $700 one-time fee. Please see the InCommon web site [31] for details and 
changes since the writing of this document.
•	 Web certificates for identity and service providers. As with any other secure web server, these 
services need web server certificates. (Note that organizations could use the InCommon Cert 
Service as described in Section A.3.3 for these certificates.)
Alternatively, organizations can choose, as discussed in Section A.5, to outsource portions of the 
Shibboleth deployment - from design consultation to service hosting. This obviously shifts internal 
effort re-allocation to out-of-pocket expenses, and while organizations may choose this route, it 
does not appear to be a requirement for most organizations capable of running their own identity 
management systems.  Outsourcing identity management services can also create additional risks, 
such as an outside entity having possession of institutional credential information.
A.4.4. Effort Required for InCommon Membership and Shibboleth 
Deployment
Most organizations choose to deploy Shibboleth (or an alternative) and manage joining 
InCommon themselves. As discussed in the previous section on expenses, staff time is the largest 
expense of this approach. It is difficult to give a quantified effort level for participating in federated 
identity as processes, expertise, culture and other factors vary between organizations and projects. 
We instead break down in Table 1 the effort required for deploying and maintaining federated 
identity and InCommon membership into a set of equivalencies to other common activities in 
terms of required effort and skills. The expectation is that the reader can judge the effort that 
these equivalent activities would require for their organization or project, and translate that into a 
quantified estimate for participation in InCommon. 
Note that we provide only a summary of the tasks in this section, focusing on the effort level rather 
than “how to” details; for details on accomplishing the tasks, please see the subsequent Roadmap 
sections on Technical Issues, and Policy and Business Process Issues.
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InCommon Membership Activity Roughly Equivalent Activity/Effort
Leadership for process of joining Requires CIO or delegate with support of campus 
leadership.
Policy and business process documentation 
and modification
Major authentication policy change, e.g., 
establishing a new minimum password strength.
Signing InCommon membership agreement Contract signing.
Deployment of Shibboleth Identity Provider 
software
Deployment of a web single sign-on system (e.g., 
CAS [5]).
Deployment of Shibboleth Service Provider 
software
Deployment of a web application protected by 
web single sign-on; varies greatly by application.
Addition of a federated partner Technically is a minor configuration change. From 
a policy perspective varies based on partner’s 
requirements; having well defined process in place 
eases this.
Software/service maintenance Maintaining a web single sign-on service. A few 
additional activities are minor overhead.
Table 1: Activities involved in joining and maintain membership in InCommon and rough estimates 
of the effort required based on equivalent activities.
A.5. Alternatives to InCommon and Shibboleth
We briefly describe some alternatives to the InCommon and Shibboleth approach highlighted in 
this Roadmap, and discuss their trade-offs.
•	 Bilateral agreements without InCommon. It is possible, at least in theory, to forgo a federation 
and use a set of bilateral agreements to support a federated identity fabric. Given the relatively 
low cost of supporting InCommon, the time costs of establishing similar bilateral agreement 
would seem to quickly outpace any savings.
•	 Using social networking identities. Instead of InCommon, an organization or project could 
utilize identities as asserted by social networking sites (e.g., Facebook, Google, Yahoo) using 
technologies such as OAuth [68] and OpenID [96]. The advantages and disadvantages of 
this approach is an area of some debate currently. On the side of social networking is that 
social networking sites absorb the costs of providing identities and users tend to already have 
such accounts. On the other hand, social networking identities tend to be self-asserted by the 
users (e.g., see [17]).  There is no institutional authority behind them, thus InCommon has 
the potential for higher strength of authentication. InCommon has the advantage of greater 
stability provided by higher education institutions, as opposed to commercial entities, which 
may change their practices due to business concerns. InCommon also has the ability to include 
attributes from the user’s home institution. It is also not an either-or situation, use cases are 
emerging [50] where these technologies are complementary: Shibboleth is used to provide 
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stronger authentication for employees and students, and OpenID is used for guest accounts to 
access less-sensitive resources.
•	 Projects can establish their own identity management system. CI projects can establish their own 
identity management systems, even utilizing single sign-on solutions to achieve some benefits 
of federated identity (such as the Earth Systems Grid [88] has done). This approach brings the 
benefit of being more of a known approach and keeps the project in control of their destiny, at 
the cost operating their own authentication infrastructure and a lack of interoperability.
•	 Alternative SAML implementations. There exist a number of open source and proprietary 
implementation alternatives to Shibboleth. We do not try to capture a list of such 
implementations here due to the fact it would be quickly out of date, but the list of InCommon 
affiliates [26] would be a good starting point for researching these alternatives. Organizations 
may want to explore these options, as it is certainly possible that while Shibboleth serves many 
organizations well, an alternative may serve a particular organization better. For example, an 
organization heavily using Microsoft products should explore federated identity products 
offered by Microsoft.
•	 Utilize a third-party identity provider. There exist commercial parties that can provide federated 
identity provider services that interoperate with InCommon for an organization that does not 
want to deploy their own service. Based on discussions, we believe a decision to pursue such an 
option is based more on an organization’s culture than any technical or effort consideration. 
The list of InCommon affiliates [26] and sponsored partners [11] are good places to start 
exploring options.
A.6. Section Conclusion
This concludes the first section of the Roadmap for using NSF Cyberinfrastructure with InCommon. 
We hope that it has provided a good overview of InCommon, federated identity, and the 
advantages, disadvantages and challenges of deploying a federated identity system to support 
collaborative research and enable better science outcomes. 
Two versions of this Roadmap are distributed: A complete version and, mainly intended for print, 
an abbreviated version. The complete version has two subsequent sections: one on Technical 
matters and one on Policy and Business Processes that go into more depth on addressing the 
challenges involved in joining InCommon and using it to support NSF cyberinfrastructure. The 
abbreviated version does not include these two sections. Both versions be may found online at:
http://www.incommon.org/nsfroadmap.html
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B. Glossary of Terms
For the reader’s convenience, we provide here a set of terms relevant to federated identity used 
throughout this document. We thank the InCommon organization as many of these definitions are 
taken from the InCommon glossary [33] and reproduced with the permission of InCommon.
•	 Administrator - In the context of InCommon, the Administrator serves as the participating 
organization’s primary registrar. The Administrator is responsible for registering and 
maintaining the policies and technical data related to the organization’s participation in the 
InCommon Federation, including the submission of the URL of the Participant’s POP and any 
Identity Provider and/or Service Provider metadata and associated certificates. The participating 
organization’s designated Executive assigns the Administrator.
•	 Assertion - The identity information provided by an Identity Provider to a Service Provider.
•	 Attribute - A single piece of information associated with an electronic identity database record. 
Some attributes are general; others are personal. Some subset of all attributes defines a unique 
individual. Examples of an attribute are name, phone number, and group affiliation.
•	 Attribute Assertion - A mechanism for associating specific attributes with a user. 
•	 Attribute Authority (AA) - The Shibboleth software service that asserts the requesting 
individual’s attributes by creating an attribute assertion and then digitally signing it. The 
receiving online Service Provider must be able to validate this signature.
•	 Attribute Release Policy (ARP) - Rules that an AA follows when deciding whether or not to 
release an attribute and its value(s)
•	 Audit - An independent review and examination of a system’s records and activities to 
determine the adequacy of system controls, ensure compliance with established security policy 
and procedures, detect breaches in security services, and recommend any changes that are 
indicated for countermeasures.
•	 Authentication (AuthN) - The security measure by which a person transmits and validates his 
or her association with an electronic identifier. An example of authentication is submitting a 
password that is associated with a user account name. 
•	 Authorization (AuthZ) - The process for determining a specific person’s eligibility to gain 
access to a resource or service, a right or permission granted to access an online system.
•	 Boarding Process – the term used to describe the process a service provider goes through on 
joining a federation to arrange receiving the attributes it requires from the identity providers.
•	 Billing Contact - In the context of InCommon, the Billing Contact is responsible for executing 
and maintaining all of the Participant’s financial transactions associated with its InCommon 
federation participation, including any necessary communication with its internal Executive 
and Administrative Contacts, and externally with federation accounting staff.
•	 Directory - A directory is a specialized database that may contain information about an 
institution’s membership, groups, roles, devices, systems, services, locations, and other 
resources.
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•	 eduPerson - An LDAP object class authored and promoted by the EDUCAUSE/Internet2 
eduPerson Task Force to facilitate the development of inter-institutional applications. The 
eduPerson object class focuses on the attributes of individuals. Current documentation on the 
eduPerson object class is available at http://www.educause.edu/eduperson/.
•	 Electronic identifier - A string of characters or structured data that may be used to reference an 
electronic identity. Examples include an email address, a user account name, a campus NetID, 
an employee or student ID, or a PKI certificate.
•	 Electronic identity - A set of information that is maintained about an individual, typically 
in campus electronic identity databases. May include roles and privileges as well as personal 
information. The information must be authoritative to the applications for which it will be 
used.
•	 Enterprise directory - An enterprise directory is a core middleware architecture that may 
provide common authentication, authorization, and attribute services to electronic services 
offered by an institution.
•	 Executive – In the context of InCommon, the Executive represents the participant organization 
regarding all decisions and delegations of authority for the responsibilities of InCommon 
Participants, including but not limited to payment of invoices, and assigning any person in the 
trusted Administrator role who submits Certificate Signing Requests, metadata, or Certificate 
Revocation Requests, and other administrative duties as described herein. The Executive is 
authorized as such in the InCommon participation agreement or by succession from the 
originally named Executive. The Executive role will typically be filled by a CIO, VP of IT, or 
other senior administrative officer responsible for the organization’s information technology 
assets.
•	 Federated identity - The management of identity information between members of a 
federation.
•	 Federation - A federation is an association of organizations that come together to exchange 
information as appropriate about their users and resources in order to enable collaborations 
and transactions.
•	 Identity - Identity is the set of information associated with a specific physical person or other 
entity. Usually not all identity attributes are relevant in any given situation. Typically an Identity 
Provider will be authoritative for only a subset of a person’s identity information.
•	 Identity credential - An electronic identifier and corresponding personal secret associated with 
an electronic identity. An identity credential typically is issued to the person who is the subject 
of the information to enable that person to gain access to applications or other resources that 
need to control such access.
•	 Identity database - A structured collection of information pertaining to a given individual. 
Sometimes referred to as an “enterprise directory.” Typically includes name, address, email 
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address, affiliation, and electronic identifier(s). Many technologies can be used to create an 
identity database or set of linked relational databases.
•	 Identity Management System - A set of standards, procedures and technologies that provide 
electronic credentials to individuals and maintain authoritative information about the holders 
of those credentials. 
•	 Identity Provider (IdP) - The originating location for a user. Previously called the Origin Site 
in the Shibboleth software implementation. For InCommon, an IdP is a campus or other 
organization that manages and operates an identity management system and offers information 
about members of its community to other InCommon participants. 
•	 InCommon federation - InCommon is a formal federation of organizations focused on 
creating a common framework for trust in support of research and education. The primary 
purpose of the InCommon federation is to facilitate collaboration through the sharing of 
protected network-accessible resources by means of an agreed-upon common trust fabric. 
InCommon participation is separate from membership in Internet2.
•	 InCommon Technical Advisory Committee - Group of individuals that provide technical 
guidance and direction for InCommon.
•	 Level of Assurance (LoA) - A level of assurance with respect to identity management is used 
convey the amount of trust one can have in an asserted identity. This is a complicated issue, 
covering, among other things, vetting practices of the institution making the assertion, the 
technical specifics of the authentication process, and institutional policies regarding password 
changing. For more detail, the reader is directed to NIST Special Publication 800-63 [62].
•	 Metadata - Data about data, or information known about an object in order to provide access 
to the object. Usually includes information about intellectual content, digital representation 
data, and security or rights management information.
•	 Participant - An organization accepted into the InCommon Federation that has met all the 
criteria for participation as either a higher education institution or a Sponsored Partner. 
•	 Participant Agreement (PA) - This is the “contract” that a potential Participant signs when 
they are accepted by the Federation. This document outlines information such as fees, and 
responsibilities to participate in InCommon. 
•	 Participant Operating Practices (POP) - This document describes how InCommon Participants 
need to describe their credential and identity management system.
•	 Persistent Identifier – A user identifier than is reused across multiple sessions. Such an 
identifier allows a service to maintain state about a user, for example, their ownership of data or 
personalization preferences.
•	 Privacy Policy - A statement to users of what information is collected and what will be done 
with the information after it has been collected.
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•	 Pseudonymous authentication - Authentication with an identifier that remains consistent 
across sessions, but doesn’t expose any personal information in itself, for example, a 
pseudonym one might create on an Internet forum.
•	 Service Provider (SP) - Previously called the Target Site in the Shibboleth software 
implementation. For InCommon, an SP is a campus or other organization that makes online 
resources available to users based in part on information about them that it receives from other 
InCommon participants.
•	 Shibboleth® - Software developed by Internet2 to enable the sharing of web resources that are 
subject to access controls such as user IDs and passwords. Shibboleth leverages institutional 
sign-on and directory systems to work among organizations by locally authenticating users 
and then passing information about them to the resource site to enable that site to make 
an informed authorization decision. The Shibboleth architecture protects privacy by letting 
institutions and individuals set policies that control what information about a user can 
be released to each destination. For more information on Shibboleth please visit: http://
shibboleth.internet2.edu/uses.html.
•	 Sponsored Partner - A business partner that provides resources to a higher education 
institution, and is sponsored for participation in InCommon by a participating higher 
education institution.
•	 Technical Contact - The Technical Contact for InCommon serves as the primary point of 
contact for all technical issues for the organization participating in InCommon. The technical 
contact communicates with federation technical staff to ensure smooth operation of the 
federation’s infrastructure.
19
20
C. References
1. Accrediting Agencies Recognized by InCommon. http://www.incommonfederation.org/
accrediting.html
2. Administrative Interface for Internet2 Services. https://service1.internet2.edu/siteadmin/
manage/
3. Barton, Tom, Jim Basney, Tim Freeman, Tom Scavo, Frank Siebenlist, Von Welch, Rachana 
Ananthakrishnan, Bill Baker, Monte Goode and Kate Keahey. Identity Federation and 
Attribute- based Authorization through the Globus Toolkit, Shibboleth, GridShib, and 
MyProxy. 5th Annual PKI R&D Workshop, 2006.
4. Basney, Jim, Terry Fleury and Von Welch. Federated Login to TeraGrid. 9th Symposium on 
Identity and Trust on the Internet, 2010. http://www.ncsa.illinois.edu/~jbasney/tgfed.pdf
5. Central Authentication Service. Jasig. http://www.jasig.org/cas/
6. CIC InCommon Silver Project: Phase 1 Report. July, 2010. http://www.cic.net/Libraries/
Technology/IdM_InCommonSilverPhase1.sflb.ashx
7. CILogon Portal Delegation. http://www.cilogon.org/portal-delegation/
8. CILogon Service. https://cilogon.org/
9. COmanage: Collaborative Organization Management. http://www.internet2.edu/
comanage/
10. Configuring Shibboleth Delegation for a Portal. https://spaces.internet2.edu/x/n4Sg/
11. Current InCommon Participants. http://www.incommonfederation.org/participants/
12. DataONE. https://www.dataone.org/
13. Developing a Coherent Cyberinfrastructure from Local Campus to National Facilities: 
Challenges and Strategies. A Workshop Report and Recommendations. EDUCAUSE 
Campus Cyberinfrastructure Working Group and Coalition for Academic Scientific 
Computation. February 2009. http://www.casc.org/papers/CASC-CCI_Workshop_Report_
and_Recommendations.pdf
14. EDUCAUSE FedId Resources. http://www.educause.edu/Resources/Browse/
FederatedIdentityManagement/31075/
15. eduPerson and eduOrg Object Classes. http://middleware.internet2.edu/eduperson/
16. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/
fpco/ferpa/index.html
17. Goodin, Dan. Interpol chief impersonated on Facebook. The Register. September 20, 2010. 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/09/20/interpol_chief_impersonated/
18. IdPAddAttribute. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/SHIB2/IdPAddAttribute/
19. IdPAddAttributeFilter. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/SHIB2/IdPAddAttributeFilter/
22
20. IdP Clustering Configuration. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/SHIB2/IdPClusterIntro/
21. IdPInstall. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/SHIB2/IdPInstall/
22. IdPLogging. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/SHIB2/IdPLogging/
23. IdPMetadataProvider. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/SHIB2/IdPMetadataProvider/
24. IdPUserAuthn. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/SHIB2/IdPUserAuthn/
25. InCommon: About InCommon. http://www.incommon.org/about.html
26. InCommon Affiliates. http://www.incommonfederation.org/affiliate/
27. InCommon Basics and Participating in InCommon: A Summary of Resources. https://
spaces.internet2.edu/download/attachments/2815/resources_booklet.pdf?version=3
28. InCommon Benefits. http://www.incommonfederation.org/benefits.cfm
29. InCommon Cert Service. http://www.incommonfederation.org/cert/
30. InCommon Education and Training. http://www.incommonfederation.org/educate/
31. InCommon Fee Structure. http://www.incommonfederation.org/fees.html
32. InCommon for Service Providers. http://www.incommon.org/partners/
33. InCommon Glossary. http://www.incommonfederation.org/glossary.cfm
34. InCommon IAM Online Presentations http://www.incommonfederation.org/iamonline/
35. InCommon Identity Assurance. http://www.incommonfederation.org/assurance/
36. InCommon Introductory Presentation https://spaces.internet2.edu/download/
attachments/2815/InC_Overview_v2.ppt?version=1
37. InCommon Library Collaboration. http://www.incommonfederation.org/library/
38. InCommon Metadata Consumption. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/InCCollaborate/
Metadata+Consumption/
39. InCommon Policies and Practices. http://www.incommonfederation.org/policies.html
40. InCommon Sponsored Partners. http://www.incommonfederation.org/sponsor.html
41. InCommon Shibboleth Metadata Configuration. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/
InCCollaborate/Shibboleth+Metadata+Config/
42. InCommon Technical Guide https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/InCCollaborate/
Technical+Guide/
43. Indiana Clinical and Translational Sciences Institute (CTSI). http://www.indianactsi.org/
44. Information from InCommon. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/InCCollaborate/
Information+from+InCommon/
45. Install Shibboleth to protect Java Servlets. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/SHIB2/
NativeSPJavaInstall/
23
46. Internet2: Boarding Process. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/fedapp/
Boarding+Process/
47. Internet2 Events. http://events.internet2.edu/
48. Internet2: FedApps Working Group. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/fedapp/Home/
49. Internet2: NIH Federation InCommon Wiki. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/
InCNIH/InC-NIH/
50. Inernet2: OpenID Use Cases. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/OpenID/Use+Cases/
51. JISC Idm Toolkit. https://gabriel.lse.ac.uk/twiki/bin/view/Projects/IdMToolkit/Toolkit/ 
52. Johnson, H. and P. Caskey. Introduction to Shibboleth Attribute Delivery. 
Educause CAMP, June 2007. http://www.educause.edu/Resources/
IntroductiontoShibbolethAttrib/161780/
53. Join InCommon. http://www.incommonfederation.org/join.cfm
54. Laser Interferometer Gavitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO). http://www.ligo.caltech.edu/
55. Leve, Kristina and Valter Nordth. Lowering costs of identity proofing by federated identity 
management. http://www.incommonfederation.org/docs/other/SWAMI_federated_idm_
roi.pdf
56. Metadata. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/SHIB2/Metadata/
57. Morgan, R. L. “Bob”, Scott Cantor, Steven Carmody, Walter Hoehn, and Ken 
Klingenstein. “Federated Security: The Shibboleth Approach.” Educause Quarterly, 
Volume 27, Number 4, 2004. http://www.educause.edu/EDUCAUSE+Quarterly/
EDUCAUSEQuarterlyMagazineVolum/FederatedSecurityTheShibboleth/157315/
58. National Science Foundation and Penn State InCommon Pilot Now Underway. 
November 17, 2010. https://iam.psu.edu/national-science-foundation-and-penn-state-
incommon-pilot-now-underway/
59. National Science Foundation Cyberinfrastructure Council. Cyberinfrastructure Vision for 
21st Century Discovery. March 2007. http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2007/nsf0728/nsf0728.pdf
60. NativeSPClustering. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/SHIB2/NativeSPClustering/
61. NativeSPMetadataProvider. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/SHIB2/
NativeSPMetadataProvider/
62. NIST Special Publication 800-63: Electronic Authentication Guideline. Version 1.0.2. 
April, 2006.
63. NITLE Shib and FedId Roadmap for Smaller Colleges and Universities. http://cnx.org/
content/m31491/latest/
64. NSF Cooperative Agreement: Supplemental Financial/Administrative Terms and 
Conditions--Large Facilities. September 25, 2006
24
65. NSF Dear Colleague Letter: Cyberinfrastructure Framework for 21st Center Science and 
Engineering (CF21). http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2010/nsf10015/nsf10015.pdf
66. NSF Resource Allocations Policies. https://www.teragrid.org/web/user-support/allocations_
policy/
67. OASIS Security Services (SAML) Technical Committee. http://www.oasis-open.org/
committees/security/
68. OAuth: Introduction. http://oauth.net/about/
69. Ocean Observatory Initiative (OOI). http://www.oceanleadership.org/programs-and-
partnerships/ocean-observing/ooi/
70. Open Science Grid. http://www.opensciencegrid.org/
71. OSG Registration Authority. https://twiki.grid.iu.edu/twiki/bin/viewauth/OSGRA/
72. Project Moonshot. http://www.project-moonshot.org/
73. ProtectNetwork. http://www.protectnetwork.org/
74. REFEDS: Research and Education Federations. http://www.terena.org/activities/refeds/
75. Science Gateways Home. https://www.teragrid.org/web/science-gateways/
76. Shib Enabled. Internet2. https://spaces.internet2.edu/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=11484
77. Shibboleth 2 Identity Provider Configuration. Internet2. https://spaces.internet2.edu/
display/SHIB2/IdPConfiguration/
78. Shibboleth: About http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/about.html
79. Shibboleth: Communicating with a Service Provider. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/
SHIB2/IdPSPCommunicate/
80. Shibboleth Deployment Checklist http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/shib-checklist-final-
website.html
81. Shibboleth Getting Started http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/get-started.html
82. Shibboleth Installation. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/SHIB2/Installation/
83. Shibboleth Mailing Lists. http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/lists.html
84. Shibboleth Support Documentation http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/support.html
85. Shibboleth: Talk to a New IdP. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/SHIB2/
NativeSPAddIdP/
86. Shibboleth Technical Deployers Info Center http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/deployers.html
87. Shibboleth Technical Manager Info Center http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/adopters.html
25
88. Siebenlist, F., R. Ananthakrishnan, D. E. Bernholdt, L. Cinquini, I. T. Foster, D. E. 
Middleton, N. Miller, and D. N. Williams, “Enhancing the Earth System Grid Security 
Infrastructure through Single Sign-On and Autoprovisioning,” Proceedings of the 5th Grid 
Computing Environments Workshop, Portland, Oregon, USA, ACM, 2009. http://www.mcs.
anl.gov/uploads/cels/papers/P1683.pdf.
89. Support. http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/support.html
90. SWITCH AAI Demo. http://www.switch.ch/aai/demo/
91. TeraGrid: Campus Champions. https://www.teragrid.org/web/eot/campus_champions/
92. TeraGrid User Portal. https://portal.teragrid.org/
93. uApprove. SWITCH. http://www.switch.ch/aai/support/tools/uApprove.html
94. Welch, Von, Tom Barton, Kate Keahey and Frank Siebenlist. Attributes, Anonymity, and 
Access: Shibboleth and Globus Integration to Facilitate Grid Collaboration. 4th Annual PKI 
R&D Workshop, 2005
95. Welch, V., Frank Siebenlist, Ian Foster, John Bresnahan, Karl Czajkowski, Jarek Gawor, Carl 
Kesselman, Sam Meder, Laura Pearlman and Steven Tuecke. Security for Grid Services. 
Twelfth International Symposium on High Performance Distributed Computing (HPDC-
12), 2003.
96. What is OpenID? http://openid.net/get-an-openid/what-is-openid/
97. X.509 Certificates in Metadata. Internet2. https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/
InCCollaborate/X.509+Certificates+in+Metadata/
26
D. Additional Resources
D.1. Future Resources
In this section we briefly discuss technologies and other services that are not available today, but 
are expected to be available in the next future and which may bring benefit to NSF CI projects and 
institutions that house NSF researchers. These technologies are listed in no particular order.
D.1.1. UApprove
uApprove [93] is a software extension to a Shibboleth IdP which allows the user to make attribute 
release decisions instead of relying on the Shibboleth IdP administrator and organization policy. 
Many organizations are hoping that by putting the decision into the hands of the users, it will ease 
concerns around FERPA [16].
D.1.2. Federated SSH Work
A current limitation of InCommon and Shibboleth is a lack of support for applications other than 
web browsers. As we discussed in the Guide to Technical Deployment, CILogon exists to bridge 
from InCommon to PKI credentials, used by many command line grid applications.
Two future developments that are working to address adding federating identity support to a 
broader range of non-web application are Project MoonShot [72] and the Federated SSH work as 
part of the COmanage project [9].
D.1.3. FedApps Working Group
Internet2 is starting a working group to investigate issues involved with making applications 
available via federated identity. This working group, entitled “FedApps” [48], is in the process of 
forming at the time of this writing.
D.2. Identity Management Resources
Establishing an identity management system is outside the scope of this document, some resources 
for doing are:
•	 The NMI-Edit web site: http://www.nmi-edit.org/started/index.cfm
•	 InCommon IAM Online: http://www.incommon.org/iamonline/
•	 Educause Federated Identity Management Resources: http://www.educause.edu/Resources/
Browse/FederatedIdentityManagement/31075/
•	 Jansson, Eric. NITLE Shibboleth and Federated Identity Management Roadmap for Smaller 
Colleges and Universities. Connexions. August 20, 2009. http://cnx.org/content/m31491/latest/
•	 JISC. The Identity Management Toolkit. https://gabriel.lse.ac.uk/twiki/bin/view/Projects/
IdMToolkit/Toolkit/
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D.3. Resources for Federated Identity Deployment
D.3.1. Examples of Deployments
In this section we list some examples of deployments to provide the reader with some real-world 
experience from institutions that may approximate their own:
•	 EDUCAUSE presentation describing experiences at UCLA, Penn State and New Castle (UK): 
http://www.educause.edu/Resources/ShibbolethCaseStudies/161773/
•	 Deploying Shibboleth: Technical Requirements, Policy Issues, and Case Studies 
(presentations from USC, Penn State, MIT): http://www.educause.edu/Resources/
DeployingShibbolethTechnicalRe/169205/
•	 Shibboleth In Use, a collection of use cases on the Shibboleth web site: http://shibboleth.
internet2.edu/shib-in-use.html
•	 InCommon Case Studies: http://www.incommonfederation.org/cases.html
•	 USC Case Study by NMI-EDIT: http://www.nmi-edit.org/case_studies/usc-shibpubc.pdf
•	 Implementing a production Shibboleth IdP service at Cardiff University (presentation slides): 
http://www.slideshare.net/JISC.AM/cardiff-jisc-fam-aston-may07/
•	 InCommon … Now That’s the Ticket. Lafayette provides students with SSO ticketing 
convenience. http://www.incommonfederation.org/docs/eg/InC_CaseStudy_UTix_
Lafayette_2009.pdf
D.3.2. InCommon Training Opportunities
The best place to look for an up to date list of training opportunities is the InCommon Education 
and Training web site [30], which includes both a list of in-person workshops and online seminars.
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The cover image is based on Joachim Bering’s etching of the city of Königsberg, Prussia as of 
1613 (now Kaliningrad, Russia). Seven bridges connect two islands in the Pregal River and the 
portions of the city on the bank. The mathematical problem of the Seven Bridges of Königsberg 
is to find a path through the city that crosses each bridge once and only once. Euler proved in 
1736 that no solution to this problem exists or could exist. This image appears on the cover of 
each of the Campus Bridging Workshop reports. 
Campus bridging is the integrated use of cyberinfrastructure operated by a scientist or 
engineer, other cyberinfrastructure on the scientist’s campus, at other campuses, the regional, 
national, and international levels in a seamless manner as if they were proximate to the 
scientist and when working within the context of a Virtual Organization make the ‘virtual’ 
aspect of the organization irrelevant (or helpful) to the work of the VO. The challenges of 
effective bridging of campus cyberinfrastructure are real and challenging – but not insolvable 
if the US open science and engineering research community works together with focus on the 
greater good of the US and the global community. Other materials related to campus bridging 
may be found at: https://pti.iu.edu/campusbridging/
